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I. ABSTRACT
State regulation of end-of-life care is about nothing more or less
than the government's relationship to its citizens' most intimate personal
choices. And while most people agree, at least superficially, that individ-
uals should be free to refuse futile and painful medical treatment, this
area of the law is nevertheless fraught with tension and difficulty. On
one hand, individuals prefer autonomy from state intrusion. Yet, on the
other, the government should have a clear and effective role in protect-
ing the vulnerable.
These dueling goals raise hard questions. What should a physician
do if a terminally ill patient seems to be acting out of despair, and not
measured consideration? What if a patient is unconscious and incapable
of relaying her wishes? What if the unconscious patient executed a liv-
1. J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Miami School of Law. I greatly appreciate the help of
my advisor, Dean Patricia White, as well as the advice of Karon Coleman, former Assistant
Miami-Dade County Attorney for Jackson Memorial Hospital, and Professor Kenneth Goodman,
director of the University of Miami's Bioethics Program.
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ing will, but the language of the living will is ambiguous? What if a
patient's family members disagree with his choice?
Florida's highest court has looked to the Florida Constitution's
explicit right of privacy as the solution to these difficulties. The Florida
Supreme Court, in every end-of-life decision it has published, has
affirmed that patients have a right to refuse medical care, including med-
ical care necessary to save or prolong their lives. This broad, categorical
authority to refuse treatment goes several steps farther than the constitu-
tional decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
The Florida legislature, concerned that the Florida Supreme Court
went too far, approached the conundrum of end-of-life care from a dif-
ferent ethical point of view-protection of the vulnerable. The Florida
Advance Directive Statute, amended to its current form in 1999,
attempts a compromise between the court's autonomy-oriented jurispru-
dence and social conservatives' concern with euthanasia and assisted
suicide. Unfortunately (and tragically for many Floridians), the legisla-
ture's attempt at compromise was hasty and ill-conceived, and resulted
in a confusing statute that tramples patient autonomy, while failing to
effectively protect the vulnerable.
The Advance Directive Statute's drafters invented a bright-line
restriction on patient autonomy that contradicts the constitutional deci-
sions of the Florida Supreme Court. The statute, in its current form,
holds that life support may never be removed from a patient, regardless
of the clarity of the patient's wishes, the advice of his or her doctor, or
the consensus of his or her family, unless two doctors determine that the
patient (1) has a "terminal condition," (2) has an "end-stage condition,"
or (3) is in a "persistent vegetative state."
This Comment argues that the terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vege-
tative state categories contradict the Florida Supreme Court's constitu-
tional cases on the right of critically ill patients to refuse hopeless
treatment. The categories' largest problem lies in their vagueness-these
are imprecise clinical criteria that the statute's drafters did not fully
understand, and indeed that doctors, patients, and courts also struggle
with. As a result, the categories draw the attention of medical and legal
decision-makers away from patient intent, and toward an evaluation of
whether a patient fits within the terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegeta-
tive state framework.
The legislature's statutory leger de main poses two perverse conse-
quences. First, for patients in what is arguably a terminal or end-stage
condition, disagreement over the applicability of the terms can, at best,
raise the specter of protracted litigation, and at worst, nullify an other-
wise valid living will. Second, the legislature's poor choice of drafting
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language also has the unintended effect-tragically demonstrated in the
Terri Schiavo case-of encouraging the removal of life support from
persistently vegetative patients whose intent is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to ascertain.
II. INTRODUCTION: FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REFUSE
MEDICAL TREATMENT
Estelle Browning enjoyed remarkable health.2 The only ailment she
suffered, well into her 80s, was high blood pressure.3 She outlived her
husband by more than a decade.4 In fact, at the time of her death, she
had outlived all her relatives except for an octogenarian second cousin.'
She was, by all recorded accounts, a happy woman.6
In her 85th year, Mrs. Browning stopped by a nursing home to visit
friends.7 Two days later, she spoke to her confidante, Rose Kings, about
the sick and incapacitated patients she had seen. "Oh Lord," Mrs.
Browning told Ms. Kings, "I hope this never happens to me."'
Mrs. Browning had already drafted a living will. She requested, in
writing, that she not be kept alive artificially if she lost consciousness
and had no hope of recovery. 9 Yet, out of an abundance of caution, Mrs.
Browning executed a second living will, stipulating the following:
If at any time I should have a terminal condition and if my attending
physician has determined that there can be no recovery from such
condition and that my death is imminent, I direct that life-prolonging
procedures be withheld or withdrawn when the application of such
procedures would serve only to prolong artificially the process of
dying. 10
"Thank God I've got this taken care of," Mrs. Browning told Ms.
Kings. "I can go in peace when my time comes."1
A year after her conversation with Ms. Kings, Mrs. Browning suf-
fered a stroke.' 2 The stroke caused irreparable damage to the portion of
2. Herbert ex rel. Browning v. State (In re Guardianship of Browning), 543 So. 2d 258, 261
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) [hereinafter Browning I], aft'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
3. Id.
4. Mrs. Browning's husband died in 1978. Id. Mrs. Browning died July 16, 1989, outliving
her husband by eleven years. State v. Herbert (Guardianship of Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, n. 1 (Fla.
1990) [hereinafter Browning 11].
5. Browning 1, 543 So. 2d at 261.
6. Id.




11. Id. at 8-9.
12. Id. at 8.
2013]
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Mrs. Browning's brain that controls conscious thought, and left her para-
lyzed, unaware, and incapable of swallowing on her own. ' 3 Her doctors
surgically grafted a feeding tube into her stomach, and transferred her to
a nursing home.14 Over the months that followed, physical problems
plagued Mrs. Browning, including instances in which her gastrostomy
tube fell out of her stomach. 15 Doctors inserted a second tube through
her mouth. 16 Yet, Mrs. Browning's condition was stable. She was per-
manently incapacitated and unlikely to ever recover, but her doctors pre-
dicted that she could live, with life support, for years to come.
A. The Constitutional, Ethical, and Practical Challenges of
Regulating Living Wills
Most Americans, like Mrs. Browning, say they would prefer a natu-
ral death over the prolonged misery of artificial life support.17 But that
widely held sentiment-while understandable-belies the practical, eth-
ical, and constitutional difficulties of whether to remove a patient's life
support. In the practical realm, the scope of difficulties is nearly endless.
How should a hospital implement a vague living will? How specific
should a court require that a living will be? And what course of action
should doctors take with an unconscious patient who has no living will
or family members?
Further, two distinct categories of ethical issues arise in end-of-life
care. First, courts and legislatures must adequately distinguish between
allowing a patient to refuse additional care, and promoting physician-
assisted suicide. Patient autonomy is a good thing; euthanasia and sui-
cide are not.' 8 Second, judges and healthcare professionals generally
should not be in the business of substituting their own conceptions of
13. Browning 1, 543 So. 2d at 261.
14. Browning I1, 568 So. 2d at 8.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Lois Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo: What Are They
Thinking?, 15 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REv. 361, 375 (2006).
18. In the criminal law context, the line between criminal "medical murder" and permissible
removal of medical treatment is by no means clear. In the influential California decision Barber v.
Superior Court, for example, the state charged doctors with murder after they removed life
support from a comatose patient, at the request of the patient's family. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (Ct.
App. 1983). The Barber court analyzed the charge in the familiar criminal paradigm of act versus
omission, and determined that the removal of medical care was an omission, rather than an
affirmative act. Id. at 1015-17. The court went on to determine that the doctors had no criminal-
law duty to provide invasive medical treatment whose burdens outweighed its benefits to the
patient. Id. at 1019-20. The Barber court's approach has been criticized as theoretically unsound,
because it resorted to legal technicalities to skirt the basic fact that the removal of life support
caused the patient's death, regardless of the exact chain of events. See Arthur Leavens, A
Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 547, 586-87 (1988).
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what a reasonable patient would want for the patient's own expressed
wishes. '9
Ever since end-of-life care moved from the province of the home to
that of the hospital, courts have struggled to address these practical and
ethical problems while respecting constitutional notions of patient dig-
nity and autonomy. 20 Here, the ultimate question is the permissible
degree of government involvement in a deeply personal choice-in
other words, how much leeway should governments have in enforcing
their own ethical and practical priorities, at the expense of patient auton-
omy? Florida's answer diverges somewhat from that given by the United
States Supreme Court.
On the federal level, the nation's highest court has not gone so far
as to declare an absolute "right" to refuse treatment. Rather, the
Supreme Court has held that various zones of privacy inherent in the Bill
of Rights imply a "liberty interest" in refusing unwanted medical inter-
ventions.2 The Florida Supreme Court, on the other hand, has provided
a clearer and more definitive answer.
In a line of cases going from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the
Florida Supreme Court has consistently articulated a powerful and
nearly inviolate right to refuse medical treatment.22 This line can be
traced to the seminal 1980 decision of Satz v. Perlmutter, in which the
court held that a dying man who could express his desire to withdraw
from treatment had a constitutional right for that desire to be respected.23
Perlmutter was followed in 1984 by John F. Kennedy Memorial v. Blud-
19. Practical considerations in the drafting and implementation of living wills have received a
great deal of thoughtful treatment in legal literature. See, e.g., Patricia D. White, Appointing a
Proxy Under the Best of Circumstances, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 849, 857-58 (1992). Indeed, the
Florida Advance Directive Statute, which is the subject of this Comment, has seen its fair share of
devastating practical critiques. See, e.g., Anita Cava, Advance Directives: Taking Control of End-
of-Life Decisions, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 5, 9 (2001); Kenneth W. Goodman, Commentary:
National Living Wills and Local Politics, ASBH EXCH. (Am. Soc'y for Bioethics & Humanities),
Summer 1999, at 6; Kenneth W. Goodman, Persistent Legislative State: Law, Education, and the
Well-Intentioned Healthcare Ethics Committee, 13 HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITTEE F. 32, 34-35
(2001). And though these practical and ethical issues cannot and should not be entirely absent
from any discussion of living wills, it is not the purpose of this Comment to delve too deeply into
subjects that have been more fully considered elsewhere. Rather, this Comment focuses on the
Advance Directive Statute's constitutional problems.
20. See Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence
of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & Emnics 182 (2001).
21. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
22. Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59
U. MiAMi L. REV. 107, 110 (2004) ("It is a well-settled principle under Florida law that
individuals have a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. In fact, the combination of
Florida's constitution, statutes, and case law appears more clearly protective of a right to refuse
such treatment than the federal due process standard discussed in Cruzan.").
23. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980).
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worth, which extended the right to refuse treatment to vegetative
patients with no hope of recovery. 24 Browning then explicitly extended
that right to all patients who have lost the ability to verbally express
their wishes.2 ' The only constitutionally-permissible restrictions on the
exercise of this right, as described in more detail below, are state inter-
ests and clear evidence of a patient's wishes for his or her end-of-life
care.
Florida's right to refuse care has proven resilient, and has survived
difficult cases. For example, in 1993, the Florida Supreme Court held
that Patricia Dubreuil had a right to refuse a blood transfusion necessary
to save her life after a caesarean section, even though her death would
leave her four children-including her newborn-without a mother.
26
Subsequent Florida appellate courts have interpreted Dubreuil and its
predecessors to amount to a "categorical authority" to refuse medical
treatment. 27 This is a far sight more definitive than the federal "liberty
interest" in refusing unwanted treatment.
The difference between the approaches taken by the Florida
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court is easily explained.
The Florida Supreme Court grounded its decision in the Florida Consti-
tution's explicit right to privacy, which provides that "[e]very natural
person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion
into the person's private life. .... -28 There is no comparable provision in
the United States Constitution, leaving the federal courts to cast about
for "penumbras" and "emanations" of liberty that create vaguer "zones"
of privacy.29
24. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984) ("We
hold that the right of a patient, who is in an irreversibly comatose and essentially vegetative state,
to refuse extraordinary life-sustaining measures, may be exercised either by his or her close family
members or by a guardian of the person of the patient appointed by the court . . . .However,
before either a close family member or legal guardian may exercise the patient's right, the primary
treating physician must certify that the patient is in a permanent vegetative state and that there is
no reasonable prospect that the patient will regain cognitive brain function and that his existence is
being sustained only through the use of extraordinary life-sustaining measures. This certification
should be concurred in by at least two other physicians with specialties relevant to the patient's
condition.").
25. Browning II, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990); see also Normal L. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy
and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 252 (1977) ("Any
other view would permit obliteration of an incompetent's panoply of rights merely because the
patient could no longer sense the violation of those rights.").
26. In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. 1993).
27. Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681, 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing In re Dubreuil,
629 So. 2d at 822) (overturning medical malpractice judgment against doctor who followed
patient's wish to detach her respirator). See also Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments
for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U. MiAMo L. REv. 57, 58 (1996).
28. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
29. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
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In theory, at least, Florida's robust constitutional right to refuse
treatment solves the practical and ethical challenges of regulating living
wills and end-of-life care. By placing decision-making power in
patients' hands, the right limits state overreach. And by focusing on
refusal of treatment, rather than affirmative acts, it attempts to foreclose
application to assisted suicide and euthanasia. However, it raises a new
problem-how do you determine the will of an unconscious person?
B. Browning's Broad Construction of Intent
A quick look at Mrs. Browning's living will indicates the degree to
which an intent-oriented jurisprudence is primed for error. Mrs. Brown-
ing stated that she wished her life support to be removed in the event she
had a "terminal condition," her death was "imminent," and there was no
hope of recovery from this condition.3 °
In response to the language of Mrs. Browning's will, one might ask
what Mrs. Browning meant, precisely, by "recovery," "imminent," and
"terminal." Certainly, Mrs. Browning's post-stroke condition did not
neatly track with this language-she could, and did, survive for years on
life support.3" This problem raises perhaps the most critical end-of-life
question in a legal system that purports to value personal autonomy over
other considerations. Specifically, what level of knowledge must a
patient have when drafting a living will, or describing her preferences to
friends and family members? It is one thing to say, as Mrs. Browning
did, that one would wish life support to be removed in the event of a
terminal condition presenting no hope of recovery. But it is much harder
to anticipate that the miracle of modem medicine presents legions of
methods of keeping a person biologically alive while failing to restore
anything close to a decent quality of life, and that these medical inter-
ventions can create a nearly infinite realm of potentially tragic choices.32
30. Browning II, 568 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1990).
31. Id.
32. In a perfect world, or at least one where all Americans had access to attorneys and doctors
who could properly advise them of their legal and medical rights, questions such as these would
scarcely ever be asked. Unfortunately, that is not our world. Most patients who receive end-of-life
care know little to nothing of the care, or the scope of their right to refuse it. See e.g. Susan Adler
Channick, The Myth of Autonomy at the End-of-Life: Questioning the Paradigm of Rights, 44
VILL. L. REv. 577, 592 (1999) ("Perhaps the most unexpected and puzzling finding regarding the
efficacy of the autonomy paradigm in health decisions has come from the Study to Understand
Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment ("SUPPORT"). SUPPORT, the
largest piece of contemporary research on the end stage of dying in America, was a $28 million
project funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and co-directed by Joanne Lynn, M.D.,
now head of the Center to Improve Care of the Dying, and William A. Knaus, M.D., now chief of
the department of health evaluative sciences at the University of Virginia School of Medicine. The
purpose of the study was to discover what happened to patients and their families in the weeks and
months following an acute episode that precipitated hospitalization for advanced illnesses. After
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This complex interaction between a known patient preference and
an unanticipated medical situation is exactly what sparked the contro-
versy in Browning. Following Mrs. Browning's stroke, her eighty-year-
old cousin, Doris Herbert, was appointed as Mrs. Browning's guard-
ian.33 Ms. Herbert, believing that Mrs. Browning's living will applied to
her semi-conscious, dependent condition, petitioned a Florida trial court
for permission to withdraw Mrs. Browning from life support.34
The State of Florida opposed Ms. Herbert's petition. The State
largely ignored the technical vagaries in Mrs. Browning's living will and
instead argued that the removal of life support from a woman in a medi-
cally stable condition could form a troubling precedent. 35 The State per-
suaded the trial court, which promptly ordered that Mrs. Browning
remain on life support.
3 6
The trial court in Mrs. Browning's case based its denial of Ms.
Herbert's petition on the meaning of the word "terminal" as contained in
Mrs. Browning's living will, and as defined in the Advance Directive
Statute.37 The statute at that time held that life support could not be
removed from a patient unless that patient was medically determined to
be terminally ill. 38 Yet, because Mrs. Browning could have lived in her
unconscious, medically supported state for an indefinite period of time
with artificial life support, the trial court reasoned that she failed to sat-
isfy the Florida Advance Directive Statute's "terminal" requirement, and
therefore, her living will could not be used to withdraw life support.39
Mrs. Browning died in the nursing home after two and a half years
on life support."n She was eighty-nine years old. Ms. Herbert's petition
to remove life support, at the time of Mrs. Browning's death, was pend-
ing before Florida's Supreme Court.4" Ms. Herbert promised to pursue
the appeal because a favorable appellate review "might help someone
observing the patients' treatment and medical decision-making, the study decided that patients
received overly aggressive treatment without sufficient discussion beforehand to enable the patient
to understand the consequences of such treatment and, presumably, to make informed choices.").
33. Browning 1, 543 So. 2d 258, 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that Ms. Herbert was
Mrs. Browning's only living relative; both her only child and her son predeceased her).





37. Browning 1, 543 So. 2d at 264.
38. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 765.04(1) (1987) (repealed 1992).
39. Browning I1, 568 So. 2d at 9 ("Construing Florida's 'Life-Prolonging Procedure Act,'
[Florida Statutes §§ 765.01-.15 (1987)], the trial court concluded that death was not imminent,
and it denied the petition.").
40. Florida Woman Dies Attached to a Tube, supra note 34.
41. Id.
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else."42
The Florida Supreme Court obliged, holding that the Florida Con-
stitution provided a powerful right to refuse medical treatment, and that
the hospital and trial court violated this right by disregarding Mrs.
Browning's living will.4 3 Notably, both the Second District and the Flor-
ida Supreme Court soundly rejected the trial court's focus on statutory
technicalities-specifically, the meaning of the word "terminal" in the
Advance Directive Statute, as drafted at the time of the case.44 While the
trial court had found the technical definition of this term to be outcome-
determinative, Florida's highest court indicated that the proper inquiry is
whether the evidence of the patient's wishes indicates a clear-if gener-
alized-desire to refuse treatment.45
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Browning illustrates that,
in questions of patient autonomy, intent trumps technicalities. In
essence, the court put the evidence of Mrs. Browning's wish to refuse
futile treatment far above the "terminal condition" requirement, or the
exact language of Mrs. Browning's living will. The Florida Supreme
Court held that a patient who has articulated a general wish to withdraw
from medical treatment, as Mrs. Browning clearly had, must have that
wish respected, even if she has subsequently lost the physical capacity to
orally articulate it.46 Implicit in the court's decision was the assumption
that a broadly worded desire to withdraw from treatment in the event of
a "terminal" illness would also apply to a tragic condition of severe and
permanent incapacitation.
4 7
In other words, Browning stands for two important propositions in
addition to its well-known holding that incapacitated Floridians retain
their right to refuse treatment.48 First, Browning indicates that technical
statutory terms describing a particular clinical prerequisite for the
removal of life support are not a critical component of any constitutional
inquiry into patient intent. 49 If the patient suffers from a dire and hope-
less condition, and if the patient had clearly stated her intention to refuse
42. Id.
43. Browning II, 568 So. 2d at 9.
44. See Browning 1, 543 So. 2d at 287 ("Distinguishing between serious illnesses, life-
threatening conditions, and terminal illnesses is frequently difficult for physicians and nearly
impossible for the legal community."); Browning I, 568 So. 2d at 9 ("We agree with the district
court that chapter 765 of the Florida Statutes (1987) is not applicable to Mrs. Browning's
situation.").
45. See Browning 1I, 568 So. 2d at 10.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 10 ("A competent individual has the right to refuse medical treatment regardless of
his or her medical condition.").
48. Id. at 12 ("Thus, our cases have recognized no basis for drawing a constitutional line
between the protections afforded to competent persons and incompetent persons.").
49. Id.
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treatment in such a condition, the patient retains a constitutional right to
do so. In implying this conclusion, the Browning court sidestepped the
fact that Mrs. Browning's condition probably did not meet a plain read-
ing of the Advance Directive Statute's definition of "terminal."5
And second, Browning teaches a similar lesson about living wills.
If the intent of the patient to refuse futile medical care at the end of her
life is clearly stated, then Browning requires no precise parsing of the
terms in her living will."1 Under Browning, an incapacitated patient did
not have to foresee any possible medical situation. Rather, if her wishes
can be shown to reasonably apply to the situation at hand, a proxy or
guardian may exercise her right to refuse treatment on her behalf.52
Browning's broad approach to the removal of life support is contro-
versial. For one, as described above, Browning and its progeny go a far
sight beyond the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on the
matter. The decision also incensed social conservatives. The Florida
Catholic Conference excoriated Browning as exhibiting "a philosophy of
excessive individualism that ignores any social action or societal role in
the protection of unborn children, teenagers, the elderly, senile, or the
infirm .... There is almost an assumption that certain patients are better
off dead than alive .. .
III. THE ADVANCE DIRECTIVE STATUTE
Florida's Advance Directive Statute represents a hasty attempt to
reign in Browning's broad, functional approach to removing life support.
Social conservatives were concerned, perhaps justifiably, that a loose
application of the case could toe the line of assisted suicide and euthana-
sia. But the compromise statute that resulted from this concern serves as
a nearly archetypical example of hard cases making bad law. The
Advance Directive Statute in effect today has essentially eviscerated
50. An argument could also be made that the Browning court implicitly rewrote the
problematic statutory definition of "terminal" to avoid an inequitable result. Under the statute (as
well as under Mrs. Browning's own living will), a "terminal" condition was one that made death
"imminent." Yet Mrs. Browning's death was not imminent-as discussed above, she could, and
did, survive for years on life support. Nevertheless, the Browning court concluded that, because
medical testimony showed that Mrs. Browning could not recover, "clear and convincing evidence
existed to support a finding that Mrs. Browning suffered from a terminal condition." Browning II,
568 So. 2d at 17. While the Browning court's disregard of the statutory immanency requirement
could be criticized as a sort of "soft" judicial activism, it nevertheless illustrates the mess that the
"terminal condition" test poses for courts, and the interpretive gymnastics required to navigate it
without violating patients' privacy rights.
51. Browning 11, 568 So. 2d at 15.
52. Id.
53. Commentary, In Re: Guardianship of Estelle M. Browning, What Hath the Supreme Court
Wrought?, 10 FLA. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE No. 3 (1990) (construing Browning II, 568 So. 2d 4
(Fla. 1990)), available at http://www.flaccb.org/Commentaries/Comm1290.htm.
[Vol. 67:861
THE ADVANCE DIRECTIVE STATUTE REVISITED
Browning's constitutional holding, and yet fails to adequately protect
vulnerable patients.
A. The Evolution of an Unconstitutional Law
In 1997, the Florida legislature and the Florida State University
Pepper Institute on Aging convened the Panel of the Study of End of
Life Care, a group of twenty health care professionals, elected officials,
scholars, and clergy, to recommend changes to the Advance Directive
Statute. 4 The Panel conducted a series of hearings and public discus-
sions across the state to gauge public sentiment on end-of-life care, and
panelists were disturbed by what they learned." Floridians regularly
reported that hospitals and doctors refused to remove life support from
patients who were dying and in pain, and who had clear living wills.
Browning's broad functional approach to the right to refuse treatment, it
seemed, had failed to take hold at the ground level.
The Panel traced hospitals' refusal to implement living wills to the
Advance Directive Statute. 56 The statute, as it existed in 1997, still con-
tained the vague "terminal condition" test that led the trial court to void
Mrs. Browning's living will, as discussed above.57 That test required
that a patient be in a "terminal condition," as determined by two doctors,
before the patient's living will would be honored. 58 A "terminal condi-
tion," as defined in the statute at the time, was a condition that would
cause death if left untreated. 59 This definition was incomprehensible to
anyone who took the time to think about it.60
The 1997 definition of terminal condition was problematic for
being both over- and under-inclusive.6" On one hand, it is hard, in many
cases, to say that a person with a terminal disease will certainly not live
with or without treatment. So, cautious doctors were more likely to over-
treat patients than to remove life support in accordance with a valid liv-
54. Cava, supra note 19 at 8-9.
55. Bebe Bahnsen, Hearing Focus is Care at the End: The Panel's Goal is to Ensure that
Floridians Have Access to Adequate Pain Management, Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Nov. 8, 1998 at
IB, available at NEwsBANK, No. 9811080235 ("Brooks said the panel has heard testimony from
people whose relatives' end-of-life wishes were ignored in some care settings even though they
had completed living wills.").
56. Diane C. Lade, Panel Discusses Giving Patients More Control Over Life's End, SUN
SEN-INEL, Feb. 8, 1999 at 1B ("[T]he doctors refused to honor [advance directives] because
Florida law states that they go into effect only when a patient is declared terminal.").
57. Goodman, Persistent Legislative State, supra note 19, at 34.
58. Goodman, National Living Wills and Local Politics, supra note 19.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See also Goodman, Commentary, supra note 19 ("This definition has served mainly to
confuse everyone who has tried to invoke it or obey the law.").
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ing will. 62 On the other hand, a literal interpretation of "terminal condi-
tion" would have legitimized absurd results. Thirst, for example, would
lead to death if left untreated. That does not, in any sensible world, make
thirst a "terminal condition" justifying the removal of life support.
Bob Brooks, an immune disease specialist and former Republican
state representative, led the panel in an effort to alter the "surreal pro-
gression" of end-of-life care, "in which rigid health care rules or high-
tech machines seize control of those important final hours. '63 The Panel
met with heavy press coverage and received extensive input from the
public. 64 Floridians shared heartbreaking stories of loved ones forced to
continue a painful existence and accept invasive, often futile surgical
interventions in the face of explicit "Do Not Resuscitate" orders and
living wills. 65 As Brooks noted, "the most common issue people [were]
bringing up is with people not having their desires fulfilled as they
approach the end of their life," even in the presence of explicit living
wills and hopeless conditions.66
The panel concluded its study with a recommendation, passed by a
nineteen-to-one vote, that the legislature delete the "terminal condition"
test from the Advance Directive Statute and reaffirm Browning's focus
on patient intent, rather than on vague clinical definitions. 67 The Florida
Board of Medicine and a considerable majority of polled doctors and
lawyers supported the panel's majority. 68 Five bipartisan committees, in
both the Florida House and Senate, voted unanimously to accept the
62. Bahnsen, supra note 55 (summarizing numerous stories in which individuals recounted
how their family members had been forced to accept unwanted life-prolonging treatment).
63. Bob Brooks, Editorial, Speak on End-of-Life Care Issues, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Oct. 26,
1998 at 9A, available at NEwSBANK, No. 9810230613.
64. Bahnsen, supra note 55.
65. Id. See also Brooks, supra note 63; Lindsay Peterson, Bill Reinforces Patients' Right to
Living Wills, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Apr. 19, 1999 at Al, available at NEwsBANK, No.
041999012; Goodman, Persistent Legislative State, supra note 19 at 34 ("Consequently, patients
who executed living wills expecting they would be spared unwanted resuscitation, were
ventilated, fed, and watered because their doctors reckoned they could thereby keep them alive,
which meant they were not terminally ill. In case after case, family members protested that a loved
one never wanted such treatment, only to be shown a signed living will in which the loved one
seemed to be agreeing to a requirement that they meet the terminal condition test."); Lade, supra
note 56 (The panel conducted eight hearings, "listening to Floridians recite heartbreaking tales and
voice their fears about slow, humiliating deaths. Their testimony persuaded panelists that Florida
needs better ways to treat its dying.") In one particularly poignant story, an elderly man executed
an explicit living will and repeatedly told his wife he did not wish to be kept alive artificially, in
the event he was incapacitated. The man suffered a massive stroke, and was kept alive, against his
wishes and his wife's requests, for weeks by an artificial respirator and feeding tube. When the
man woke from his coma, he was barely functional and unable to recognize his wife of more than
50 years. He died in a nursing home.
66. Bahnsen, supra note 55.
67. Cava, supra note 19, at 8; Goodman, Persistent Legislative State, supra note 19, at 36.
68. Lade, supra note 56.
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recommendation.69 And that was as far as it went.
The panel's lone dissenting vote, Jim Towey, 70 attacked the major-
ity, echoing the earlier critiques of Browning. Towey claimed that the
Panel's recommendation "would make Florida one of the most liberal
states when it comes to dying."71 "What scares me," Towey said, "is that
there isn't any safety net out there for people who are uninsured or mak-
ing decisions when depression is at work."
'72
Towey's minority position ultimately carried the day. According to
a member of the panel, Towey persuaded then-Governor Jeb Bush to
threaten to veto any legislation that made it "easier" for people to die.
73
Shortly before the Legislature voted on the new Advance Directive Stat-
ute, the "terminal condition" requirement was quietly reinserted in to the
bill.
74
The Legislature did not stop, however, at ignoring the panel's rec-
ommendation. Not only did the Legislature retain the "terminal condi-
tion" language,75 it also added two new and similarly vexing terms:
"persistent vegetative state"76 and "end-stage condition. ' 7 7 There is no
recorded legislative rationale for making these changes.78 Apparently the
"end-stage condition" and "persistent vegetative state" categories were
69. Goodman, Persistent Legislative State, supra note 19, at 36.
70. Towey, currently president of Ave Maria University, has served as legal counsel to
Mother Teresa and director of President George W. Bush's Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives. See President's Page: H. James Towey, AVE MARIA UNIV., http://www.avemaria.edu/
AboutAveMaria/PresidentsPage.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
71. Lade, supra note 56.
72. Id.; See also Alison Cossetti, End-of-Life Care in Florida: Should the Law Follow the
Lobbyists or the People's Wishes?, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 13, 18 (2001) (noting that Towey and
the Florida Catholic Conference were concerned that removing the terminal condition requirement
"might subtly encourage the health care industry to withhold expensive care from the poor and
other vulnerable people who are [not] clearly dying.") (alteration in original) (quoting Peterson,
supra note 65).
73. Telephone interview with Kenneth Goodman, Dir., Univ. of Miami Bioethics Program
(Dec. 2011).
74. Lucy Morgan, End-of-Life Measure Advances, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at
B6.
75. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(17) (2012) ("'Terminal condition' means a condition caused by
injury, disease, or illness from which there is no reasonable medical probability of recovery and
which, without treatment, can be expected to cause death.").
76. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(12) (2012) ("'Persistent vegetative state' means a permanent and
irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of voluntary action or
cognitive behavior of any kind. (b) An inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the
environment.").
77. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(4) (2012) ("'End-stage condition' means an irreversible condition
that is caused by injury, disease, or illness which has resulted in progressively severe and
permanent deterioration, and which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, treatment of
the condition would be ineffective.").
78. Legislature Clarifies, Corrects Aspects of State's Advance Directive Statute, FLA.
BIoETHIcs NETWORK, Summer 2011, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Legislature Clarifies] (noting that the
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the product of a compromise intended to garner conservative support for
the bill.79
The compromise worked. The Florida Catholic Conference imme-
diately reversed its opposition to the Advance Directive Statute and
announced its support for the new version. 0 The Legislature jammed the
changes into an omnibus bill in a flurry of end-of-session activity. 81
Governor Jeb Bush signed the bill into law on June 11, 1999.82 It is still
the law today. The only notable change has been a slight tweak to the
definition of "end-stage condition" in 2001.83
B. The Mechanics of the Advance Directive Statute
The Florida Legislature's 1999 revisions to the Advance Directive
Statute did not alleviate the problems addressed in Browning and further
identified by the Panel of the Study of End of Life Care. If anything, the
addition of the "end-stage condition" and "persistent vegetative state"
categories made the Statute more unwieldy than it had been when it
contained only the "terminal condition" requirement. Now, hospitals
have three, rather than one, confusing and vague clinical definitions to
contend with when considering a patient's living will. The effects of
these amendments, both practically and constitutionally speaking, are
troubling.
A complete understanding of why the 1999 categories contradict
Browning first requires an understanding of how the Advance Directive
Statute was intended to work, absent the end-stage/ terminal/ persistent
vegetative state restrictions. Apart from these restrictions, the statute
more or less codifies Browning and its progeny, with a few added proce-
dural protections. The statute begins by noting that "[t]he Legislature
finds that every competent adult has the fundamental right of self-deter-
mination regarding decisions pertaining to his or her own health, includ-
ing the right to choose or refuse medical treatment.
84
The Florida Supreme Court's decisions recognize that this right-
legislature added the three tests, "which many patients, families and health professionals have
found onerous," for purely "political considerations.").
79. Cossetti, supra note 72, at 19 ("The lobbyists and the senators might believe that this is a
sufficient compromise, but it still does not give people the option to refuse treatment in the early
stages of a disease that they know will only get worse. In addition, the classifications are still
subject to interpretation, despite being defined in the Senate Bill."); Cava, supra note 19, at 9
("Appreciating exactly what these words mean requires a degree of medical/legal sophistication.
The statute sets out to draw some parameters, but it is obvious that the devil is in the details.").
80. Morgan, supra note 74.
81. Goodman, Commentary, supra note 19, at 6.
82. Id.
83. Legislature Clarifies, supra note 78, at 1.
84. FLA. STAT. § 765.102(1) (2012).
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like all constitutional rights 8 5-is not unfettered. Two constitutionally
acceptable restrictions on the right to refuse medical care emerge from
the court's end-of-life jurisprudence. The first is evidentiary. Most peo-
ple do not execute living wills, and the statute-as Browning directs-
demands clear and convincing evidence of all patients' wishes for their
own end-of-life care. The second restriction involves a balancing of cer-
tain state interests against an individual's right to refuse treatment.
1. PROOF-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE TREATMENT
Under Perlmutter and Dubreuil, competent and conscious patients
have a nearly ironclad right to refuse treatment. And under Browning
and Bludworth, this right extends to unconscious (aka "incompetent")
patients who expressed their desires at a time when they were competent
to do so.86 Yet, it can be damnably difficult to divine the wishes of an
incompetent patient-even one who drafted a living will. As discussed
in detail above, even Mrs. Browning's living will was rather vague in
application. So what should courts and hospitals do, when a patient's life
could hinge on the interpretation of broad, unspecific terminology?
What if a patient did not leave a living will, but instead had a long
conversation with a close friend regarding his final wishes? What if a
patient, rather than having a long conversation, flippantly mentioned,
after watch Awakenings on cable, that she would rather die than live in a
coma?
In other words, Browning's holding creates not only an ethical
challenge, but an evidentiary one as well. How do we know which
sophisticated and complex medical interventions that a person with no
medical training would have chosen to accept or reject in a given
situation?
In Browning, the Florida Supreme Court indicated that the Florida
Constitution provides incompetent individuals the right to refuse treat-
ment, even if their expressed wishes were broad, vague, or inarticulate.
The court held Mrs. Browning's living will valid, even though the docu-
ment addressed a "terminal" condition and "imminent" death, because
85. See, e.g., Justice David H. Souter, Harvard University's 359th Commencement Address,
124 HARV. L. REv. 429, 433-34 (2010) ("We want order and security, and we want liberty. And
we want not only liberty but equality as well. These paired desires of ours can clash, and when
they do a court is forced to choose between them, between one constitutional good and another
one. The court has to decide which of our approved desires has the better claim, right here, right
now, and a court has to do more than read fairly when it makes this kind of choice.").
86. See e.g. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla.
1984) ("We agree with the district court that terminally ill incompetent persons being sustained
only through use of extraordinary artificial means have the same right to refuse to be held on the
threshold of death as terminally ill competent persons.").
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Mrs. Browning had indicated a broad desire to withdraw from treatment
in any situation of incapacitation with no hope of recovery. Similarly,
the Advance Directive Statute also contains mechanisms that focus the
attention of judges, attorneys, and healthcare providers on evidence of
patient intent.87
Specifically, the statute, like Browning, places the burden of proof
on the party attempting to remove life support, and requires-also like
Browning-clear and convincing evidence. The statute explicitly guar-
antees that a patient who has executed a living will is entitled to "a
rebuttable presumption of clear and convincing evidence" of intent to
refuse treatment.88 A physician treating a patient with an explicit living
will "may proceed as directed by the principal in the living will,"89 with-
out fear of criminal or civil liability.9° The only proof-based restriction
on the implementation of a living will is that a physician's decision to
remove life support can be challenged by a family member, doctor, or
other "interested person," who may present evidence that the living will
is "ambiguous, or the patient has changed his or her mind after execu-
tion of the advance directive."'"
The Statute divides patients without a living will into two broad
categories: those who have appointed a health care "surrogate," and
those who have not.92 Put simply, patients with "surrogates"-individu-
als specially appointed to make choices on the patient's behalf93-are
second best to patients with living wills, and patients without either are
the third best. Surrogates are legally authorized to make health care deci-
sions on behalf of an incompetent patient, including the decision to
remove life support, so long as the patient "does not have a reasonable
medical probability of recovery."94
The statute gives the least evidentiary deference to a patient who
did not execute a living will or delegate the authority to make health-
care-related decisions to someone else. 95 This is the most significant cat-
87. As discussed in greater detail below, the terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative state
categories ultimately overshadow this initial statutory focus on intent.
88. FLA. STAT. § 765.302(3) (2012).
89. FLA. STAT. § 765.304(1) (2012).
90. FLA. STAT. § 765.109(1) (2012).
91. FLA. STAT. § 765.105(2) (2012).
92. See Shepherd, supra note 17, at 364 ("Surrogate decision-making is generally considered
second best to the living will.").
93. See FLA. STAT. § 765.203 for a sample surrogate designation form. FLA. STAT. § 765.202
governs the procedure by which a surrogate is appointed.
94. FLA. STAT. § 765.305(2)(a) (2012).
95. In fact, the end-stage/ terminal/ persistent vegetative state categories only apply, under the
plain language of the statute, to those patients with a surrogate, but without a living will, and not
to (1) patients with living wills, or (2) patients without living wills or surrogates (i.e., those with
proxies). Fla. Stat. § 765.305(b)(2) (2012). Like the portion of the statute dealing with pregnant
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egory in the statute, as more than eighty percent of people do not have a
living will or a designated healthcare decision-maker.96 Patients who fall
into this category have a health care "proxy" appointed for them by stat-
ute, with preference given to closer family relations.97 The proxy may
make health care decisions for the patient,98 including the decision to
withhold life-sustaining treatments, but must prove by "clear and con-
vincing evidence that the decision would have been the one the patient
would have chosen had the patient been competent. . ,,99 This require-
ment can be difficult to meet, particularly in cases involving young and
apparently healthy people who never thought to explicitly discuss their
end-of-life care preferences with friends or family members.
Still, there are sound policy reasons to statutorily restrict the free-
dom of proxies to make healthcare-related decisions for their family
members. There is no ironclad guarantee that a family member will
know what a patient would choose in any given situation.'l° In fact, one
study showed that proxies and patients, faced with the same set of hypo-
thetical facts, make different decisions on whether to forego or continue
health care treatments as much as thirty percent of the time. 1
Furthermore, evidence of the desires of a patient without a living
will is often spotty, taking the form of hearsay, "don't let me live like
that" statements. Such statements should be viewed with extreme skepti-
cism when brought to court as evidence supporting a petition to with-
draw treatment. For one, these statements would be inadmissible hearsay
(absent an exception) in a normal trial. Moreover, they do not indicate
the kind of careful consideration of a person who took the time to draft a
living will or appoint a healthcare surrogate. Finally, such statements are
apt to be even less specific than the conditional language in typical liv-
ing wills. So, a high burden of proof on an incapacitated patient's proxy
is a useful and necessary safeguard against the removal of medical
patients, this provision appears to contain a latent drafting error. Taking the statute as a whole, the
end-stage/ terminal/ persistent vegetative state restrictions are meant to apply to patients with
living wills as well as patients without living wills or surrogates. Certainly, it would be illogical to
apply a bright-line restriction to patients with greater evidence of intent (those with surrogates),
but not to patients with little to no evidence of intent (those with proxies).
96. Shepherd, supra note 17, at 374 ("This number has remained relatively constant despite
efforts to educate the public about living wills, laws requiring hospitals to inform patients about
the availability of living wills, and programs to increase the facility of doctors and other health
care providers in talking to patients about living wills.").
97. FLA. STAT. § 765.401 (2012).
98. § 765.401(2).
99. § 765.401(3).
100. See Winick, supra note 27, at 75.
101. Jan Hare, Clara Pratt & Carrie Nelson, Agreement Between Patients and Their Self-
Selected Surrogates on Difficult Medical Decisions, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1049,
1051-53 (1992).
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2. POLICY-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE TREATMENT
The Advance Directive Statute's second inhibition is rooted in
Browning's recognition that some state interests can, in limited circum-
stances, trump individual autonomy. 10 3 The Florida Supreme Court has
identified four compelling state interests that can, on a case-by-case
basis, counterbalance a patient's wish to refuse medical treatment. 1°4
Those are (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of innocent third
parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession. 10 5 Interests associated with
euthanasia, such as expense or convenience, are not to be considered
under any circumstances.1
0 6
The Advance Directive Statute incorporates these restrictions in
several ways. For example, the statute provides that, absent a court
order, a surrogate or proxy cannot provide consent for experimental
treatments, electroshock therapy, psychosurgery, or sterilization."7 And
it also controversially restricts the removal of life support from pregnant
women.'0 8 Under the statute, an unconscious or otherwise incompetent
woman with an explicit living will and a legally designated health care
surrogate may not exercise her right to refuse medical treatment before
102. In his dissent to the majority opinion in Cruzan, Justice Brennan pointed out that
Missouri's presumption in favor of treating patients without living wills presented an asymmetric
burden. That is, while the proxy bears the burden of proving a wish to refuse treatment, no
evidence whatsoever is required to maintain treatment, or, in Justice Brennan's words, to make the
patient a "passive prisoner of medical technology." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302, 315-17 (1990). Justice Brennan's approach is worth noting here
because Florida, like Missouri, requires evidence of an intent to refuse treatment, but no evidence
of any desire to accept treatment. Florida's judges and legislators, like most lawmakers
nationwide, apparently disagree with Brennan's approach, which largely ignores the practical
pressures, such as economic cost and emotional strain, that might lead proxies or families to reach
decisions that may not be in an incompetent patient's best interests.
103. Browning 1I, 568 So. 2d 4, 13-14 (Fla. 1990) ("The state has a duty to assure that a
person's wishes regarding medical treatment are respected. That obligation serves to protect the
rights of the individual from intrusion by the state unless the state has a compelling interest great
enough to override this constitutional right. The means to carry out any such compelling state
interest must be narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of
the individual.").
104. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Browning,
568 So. 2d at 14).
105. Id.
106. Browning 11, 568 So. 2d at 13.
107. FLA. STAT. § 765.113 (2012).
108. FLA. STAT. § 765.113(2) (2012).
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her fetus is "viable,"' 9 that is, deliverable, 10 absent a court order."'
Most states have similar restrictions.'
1 2
These restrictions, whether you agree with them or not, are never-
theless on the spectrum of state interests that can, in limited circum-
stances, trump an individual's right to refuse medical care. The bans on
fringe therapies such as psychosurgery and sterilization protect the
integrity of the medical profession, and the pregnancy-related restric-
tions protect the life of the unborn. This makes them a stripe of a differ-
ent color than the terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative state
categories, as demonstrated in further detail below.
C. Off the Rails: The Statute Abandons Its
Constitutional Framework
So far, so good. The Advance Directive Statute's evidentiary and
policy-based restrictions-while their wisdom can be debated-are at
least grounded in a coherent body of constitutional law. The next restric-
tion is not. After articulating the Browning proof- and policy-based
restrictions on the right to refuse medical treatment, the Advance Direc-
tive Statute presents a third condition: after a patient's wishes are deter-
mined to a reasonable certainty, and after all policy-based restrictions
are disposed of, hospitals must then determine whether a patient (1) has
a terminal condition, (2) has an end-stage condition, or (3) is in a persis-
tent vegetative state. If two doctors cannot agree that a patient falls
within one of these ill-defined categories, the patient's life support may
not be removed, regardless of the patient's living will or actual
condition.
The terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative state categories do
not fit within the Florida Supreme Court's constitutional framework.
The court allows the right to refuse medical care to be counterbalanced,
on a case-by-case basis, by state policy interests or a lack of clear evi-
109. FLA. STAT. § 765.113(2) (2012).
110. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (defining "viability" as the point at which the
fetus has the capacity for "meaningful life" on its own).
111. This provision actually states that a proxy or surrogate may not consent to "[w]ithholding
or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures from a pregnant patient prior to viability." FLA. STAT.
§ 765.113(2) (2012). Taken literally, this provision means that doctors can remove a pregnant
woman's life support once the fetus is viable, i.e., deliverable, regardless of whether the doctors
actually deliver the unborn child. Clearly, the statute's drafters intended for the child to be
delivered first, and then for life support to be removed. But this intention-like so many things in
the statute-is not explicitly drafted into the statute.
112. See e.g. Craig K. Van Ess, Living Wills and Alternatives to Living Wills: A Proposal-The
Supreme Trust, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 2 at 569 (Spring 1992) ("Under the typical living will statute, a
competent, non-pregnant adult may" execute a living will.) (emphasis added).
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dence of the patient's wishes. Yet the Statute's three categories do not
appear to fit within either exception.
The terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative state categories are
clearly not proof-based, as they bear no relationship to a patient's final
wishes. Imagine, for example, the rare patient who follows the advice of
both lawyers and academics, and executes an explicit living will. The
patient even goes so far as to learn some basic facts about end-of-life
care and to explicitly describe the situations in which she would prefer
to withdraw life support. This patient is then involved in a car accident,
which leaves her tragically brain-dead and incapable of breathing or
swallowing on her own. She has no chance of recovery, and her family
members agree that her wish, in this situation, would be to remove life
support and pass away naturally.
In this case, there is no controversy over the patient's wishes. Her
desire is clear, and her condition is hopeless and irreversible. She is kept
alive only by a feeding tube and respirator. Yet hospital lawyers could-
and indeed, should, under the Advance Directive Statute-advise this
patient's doctors to disregard her living will. The patient does not clearly
have a terminal condition, because she can be kept alive indefinitely by
artificial support. The patient does not have an end-stage condition,
because her health remains stable as long as she is attached to a respira-
tor and feeding tube. Finally, she is in a coma, rather than a persistent
vegetative state. 13 In this hypothetical situation, the end-stage/ terminal/
persistent vegetative state restrictions block the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right, regardless of how well-articulated, clearly documented, or
appropriate that exercise is.
Similarly, the terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative state cate-
gories do not readily fit within the Florida Supreme Court's framework
for policy-based restrictions on the right to refuse medical care. In Flor-
ida, an individual's right to refuse medical treatment can be overcome
only by a "compelling" state interest.! 14 Moreover, the means used to
enforce that state interest must be "narrowly tailored in the least intru-
sive manner possible."' ' 5 The terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative
state categories upset this balance, because they can counteract a clearly
articulated desire to refuse treatment in situations with no easily identifi-
able state interest. For example, in the hypothetical posed above, the
patient is not pregnant. She is not being subjected to marginal therapies.
113. The distinction between "coma" and "persistent vegetative state" is not entirely clear to
this author, but is discussed in slightly greater detail below.
114. Browning H, 568 So. 2d at 13-14.
115. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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She is not suicidal. Yet she is forced to remain brain-dead and on life
support indefinitely.
The Advance Directive Statute's restriction on the right of pregnant
women to refuse medical care is instructive in how it differs from these
categories. Academic commentators have attacked Florida's restrictions
on the rights of pregnant women to refuse medical care as reducing
women to the status of "chattel" or an "incubator or reproductive vessel"
for the state. 16 These polemics hinge on the weight given to state inter-
ests and a particular theoretical approach to fetal life. The commentators
argue that the woman's right to refuse medical treatment should out-
weigh the state's interest in preserving the life of the unborn.
Nevertheless, if you view fetal life as human life, then there is a
state interest in its preservation.' 17 Additionally, there's an evidentiary
issue lurking in the background of this provision, as few women would
probably anticipate, in living wills or even casual conversation, the pos-
sibility of being pregnant and incapacitated. Reasonable people can disa-
gree about how much weight should be given to these considerations,
but the fact of a state interest in the preservation of human life and
informed choices remains. Moreover, the Florida legislature has deter-
mined that the state's interest in fetal life temporarily outweighs the
mother's interest in refusing medical care.
There is, however, no similar balancing of rights and policy inform-
ing the end-stage/ terminal/ persistent vegetative state categories." 8 The
statutory restrictions on the removal of life support from pregnant
women reflect a coherent policy judgment that fetal life is generally
more important than an incapacitated woman's right to refuse treatment.
Moreover, the pregnancy restriction is limited in scope to the point at
which the fetus is capable of meaningful life beyond the womb. Yet the
three statutory restrictions, on the other hand, are subject to no weighing
or balancing whatsoever. They form a bright-line, insurmountable obsta-
116. See, e.g. James M. Jordan III, Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of
Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (1988)
("legislatures and courts may treat a woman as chattel and disregard her privacy rights once she
'becomes vegetative or brain-dead"); Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual?: The Legal and
Policy Deficiencies of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Directive
Statutes, 54 Md. L. Rev. 528, 550 (1995) ("Simply allowing the state at the point of fetal viability
to dictate what shall be done with an incompetent pregnant woman's body is violative of basic
societal, moral, and philosophical beliefs and would equate an incompetent pregnant woman with
an incubator or reproductive vessel.").
117. See Singletary, 665 So. 2d at 1105 ("Generally, the state interest in the preservation of life
is considered the most significant.") (citing Browning I1, 568 So. 2d at 14).
118. See Cava, supra note 19, at 8 ("Curiously, however, who effectuates the patient's desires
is not nearly as complicated as when such desires become effective. Deciding when to 'provide,
withhold, or withdraw life-prolonging procedures' in accordance with the advance directive is
fraught with legal and ethical conundrums.").
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cle to refusing medical care in any situation in which doctors and law-
yers disagree about what category a patient might fit into.
V. TERRI SCHIAVO: A CASE STUDY IN THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES
OF BAD DRAFTING
The sad case of Terri Schiavo is well-known, but its complex inter-
action with the mechanisms of the Advance Directive Statute has largely
been ignored. Yet the Schiavo case makes for the ultimate case study in
the deep constitutional and practical flaws of the statute. Florida's
Advance Directive Statute was the battleground on which Michael Schi-
avo's controversial petition to remove his wife's life support was fought.
Yet, the statute did not work as intended. It did not mandate a searching
inquiry into Terri's end-of-life wishes or best interests. Instead, it
focused the courts' attention on one criterion that should have been tan-
gential-whether Terri was in a persistent vegetative state.
Terri Schiavo was an apparently healthy 26-year-old woman when
she had a heart attack and fell into a coma. Like most Americans, Terri
had no living will or designated healthcare decision-maker. 1 9 As man-
dated in the Advance Directive Statute, her husband stepped in as her
proxy.120 Michael Schiavo's first act was to sue Terri's obstetrician,
from whom he won a million-dollar malpractice judgment. 2' Most of
that money was held for Terri's medical treatment.1 2
2
The Schiavo controversy familiar to the general public began when
Michael, as Terri's proxy, initiated proceedings to take his wife off life
support. 123 At that point, Terri had been bedridden for seven years. Her
heart attack had cut off oxygen flow to her brain for long enough to
cause irreparable damage to her cerebral cortex, the portion of the brain
119. See Recent Developments-Health Care Law-Treatment-Privacy Rights-Due
Process-Withdrawal of Life Support-The Theresa Schiavo Decisions, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
356, 362 (2005) [hereinafter Recent Developments] (citing Schindler v. Schiavo ex rel. Schiavo
(In re Guardianship of Schiavo), 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter
Schiavo 1]); Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, (Mis)framing Schiavo as Discrimination
Against Persons with Disabilities, 61 U. MiAMi L. REV. 789, 810-11 (2007) ("Part of what made
the Schiavo litigation difficult from the beginning was the fact that Tern Schiavo had not executed
any of the instruments available under Florida law to designate a preferred decision-maker or to
direct her management-medical or otherwise-in case of incapacity. This was not surprising
because Terri Schiavo was a young adult who was happily married and surrounded by a loving
family. Schiavo thus involved issues about guardianship and proxy decision-making, but did not
include the involvement of a designated surrogate.").
120. Recent Developments, supra note 119, at 358.
121. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 178.
122. Id.
123. See 0. Carter Snead, Dynamic Complementarity: Terri's Law and Separation of Powers
Principles in the End-of-Life Context, 57 FLA. L. REV. 53, 59 (2005).
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responsible for conscious thought.124 By mid-1996, CAT scans showed
that nearly all of Terri's cerebral cortex had withered and been replaced
with fluid. 125
Still, Terri was not in a coma. She could not swallow on her own,
but she could breathe without the aid of a respirator. Moreover, she at
least retained the appearance of a capacity to interact with her environ-
ment. Widely viewed YouTube videos show Terri gasping, and appar-
ently laughing, as her father speaks to her in a gentle voice.1 26 She was,
in other words, in a gray area of personal awareness and consciousness
known as a "persistent vegetative state."
A. The Dangers of the Advance Directive Statute's Vague
Clinical Categories
"Persistent vegetative state" is possibly an even more dubious and
vague designation than terminal condition or end-stage condition. A per-
sistent vegetative state, according to the statute, is a condition of
"unconsciousness in which there is (a) [t]he absence of voluntary action
or cognitive behavior of any kind [and] (b) [a]n inability to communi-
cate or interact purposefully with the environment." '27 Though the line
between the two can be difficult to identify for those without medical
training, a patient in a persistent vegetative state is not in a coma.
128
A persistent vegetative state is a nuanced and technical medical
designation whose brief definition in the Advance Directive Statute
belies its complexity as a medical concept. A persistent vegetative state
diagnosis is so complex that the American Academy of Neurology
developed a lengthy, densely researched definition for neurologists. 2 9
According to the AAN, persistently vegetative patients may be in the
end stage of a degenerative neurological disease, such as Alzheimer's, or
they may be recovering from a traumatic incident.' 30 The condition is
difficult to diagnose. A patient exhibiting even a minor ability to track
objects with his or her eyes is not in a persistent vegetative state, accord-
ing to the AAN, and could be experiencing some self-awareness and
124. Recent Developments, supra note 119, at 358.
125. Id.
126. GordanWayneWatts, Terri Schiavo footage right B4 her death. YoUTUBE (Sept. 16,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7fulbiC7Co.
127. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(12) (2012).
128. Definition of Coma, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/
coma/DS00724 (A "coma" is "a state of prolonged unconsciousness").
129. See Special Article, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (pt. 1), 330 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1499 (1994), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM1994052633
02107#t=article.
130. Id. at 1499.
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brain function.' These complexities led one organization to argue that
removing life support from Terni, on the basis of her persistently vegeta-
tive state, was morally equivalent to euthanizing the disabled.
13
1
Before the 1999 amendments, "persistent vegetative state" was an
example of a type of "terminal condition" and not an end-of-life cate-
gory of its own. 133 Even then, it was regarded by many as a drafting
error,' 34 because a "persistent vegetative state" is, by definition, not ter-
minal. A persistent vegetative state may either linger indefinitely, or
slowly improve-indeed, in many cases, patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state have a significant chance of recovery. 13 5 Certainly, the Florida
legislature did not intend to encourage the removal of life support from
patients who could get better. Yet, the 1999 amendments to the Advance
Directive Statute elevated "persistent vegetative state" to its own bright-
line statutory category, alongside "terminal condition" and "end-stage
condition."
B. Terri's Unknowable Intent
The Advance Directive Statute and the Florida Supreme Court
agree that any inquiry regarding the removal of life support from an
incapacitated patient should include a hard look at the evidence of the
patient's intent. Further, the burden of proof on the party seeking to
remove life support is, and should be, a high one. According to the stat-
ute, a party petitioning for the removal of life-sustaining treatments must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the decision is the one that
the incapacitated patient would have wanted, or, at the very least, that
the decision is in the patient's best interest.'
36
In other words, the Advance Directive Statute creates a simple bur-
den-shifting mechanism. The party wishing to withdraw life support
from an incapacitated patient has the initial burden of proving that the
patient would have wanted to withdraw treatment.1 37 An "interested
131. See id.
132. Brief of Amici Curiae Not Dead Yet et al. In Support of Appellant and Requesting
Reversal, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (No. SC04-925), 2004 WL 1713757 at
"1-2.
133. Cava, supra note 19 at 8.
134. Id.
135. See Special Article, supra note 129 ("The condition may be transient, marking a stage in
the recovery from severe acute or chronic brain damage, or permanent, as a consequence of the
failure to recover from such injuries.").
136. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(h)(3) (2012) ... a proxy's decision to withhold or withdraw life-
prolonging procedures must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the decision
would have been the one the patient would have chosen had the patient been competent or, if there
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party", such as a family member of the patient, then has the option to
oppose the petition, and present evidence of a contrary intent.1
38
Superficially, the Schiavo case seems to have followed this statu-
tory back-and-forth. Michael Schiavo presented evidence that he
claimed evinced an intent on Terri's part to withdraw from life support.
Terri's family attempted to refute this evidence, and lost. Terri's life
support was then removed. Yet, commentators who claim that this case
is a textbook example of how the Advance Directive Statute is meant to
work 139 are only half-right. All of the briefs, decisions, and publicity of
the Schiavo case have obscured one notable constitutional fact-the
Advance Directive Statute requires clear and convincing evidence, and
Michael did not have it.
Michael Schiavo attempted to meet his burden of proof using hear-
say statements that Terri had allegedly made to him, her friends, and her
family. These statements were few, and they were vague.' 40 Yet, despite
the paucity of his evidence, Michael was, understandably, passionate in
his belief that Terri would not have wanted to live in a vegetative
state.14'
Terri's parents, Robert and Mary Schindler, took advantage of their
statutory right to challenge Michael's petition to remove Terri's life sup-
port.' 4 2 The Schindlers attacked Michael, claiming he wanted to kill
Terri in order to inherit her money 4 3 and marry one of the women he
had been romantically involved with since Teri's accident."' And the
138. FLA. STAT. § 765.105 (2012) ("The patient's family, the health care facility, or the
attending physician, or any other interested person who may reasonably be expected to be directly
affected by the surrogate or proxy's decision concerning any health care decision may seek
expedited judicial intervention pursuant to Rule 5.900 of the Florida Probate Rules, if that person
believes: (1) The surrogate or proxy's decision is not in accord with the patient's known desires or
the provisions of this chapter; (2) The advance directive is ambiguous, or the patient has changed
his or her mind after execution of the advance directive; (3) The surrogate or proxy was
improperly designated or appointed, or the designation of the surrogate is no longer effective or
has been revoked; (4) The surrogate or proxy has failed to discharge duties, or incapacity or illness
renders the surrogate or proxy incapable of discharging duties; (5) The surrogate or proxy has
abused powers; or (6) The patient has sufficient capacity to make his or her own health care
decisions.").
139. See Edward J. Larson, From Cruzan to Schiavo: Similar Bedfellows in Fact and at Low,
22 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 405, 405 (2005) ("Whatever else may be said about it, Terri
Schiavo's death was legal. It scrupulously complied with Florida state law.").
140. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 180.
141. Dateline: 'It's My Turn to Talk, Says Michael Schiavo (NBC television broadcast Mar.
24, 2006), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.comlidl1943750/ns/datelinenbcltlits-my-tum-
talk-says-michael-schiavo/#.UWBrQ5OG3zw.
142. Snead, supra note 123 at 59-71, 88.
143. Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
144. Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of Schiavo), 800 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) [hereinafter Schiavo II]; see also Terri Schiavo's Parents Exhaust Legal Options,
CNN.coM (Mar. 27, 2005), http:l/transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0503127/sm.02.html.
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Schindlers produced their own witnesses, including two of Michael's
former girlfriends (and one girlfriend's husband), who testified that
Michael had invented his statements of Terri's intent.
1 45
Despite its weaknesses, Michael's evidence carried the day. Even
though Florida courts apply a presumption that a patient would wish to
be kept alive, 46 and even though the Advance Directive Statute requires
"clear and convincing" evidence of patient intent, one judge after
another ruled that Michael's hearsay evidence sufficed to remove Terri's
life support. 147 In 2005, fifteen years after Terri first collapsed, her feed-
ing tube and hydration were finally removed, and she died of starvation
and dehydration about two weeks later.'
4 8
This is not, however, the complete story of the Schiavo case. In
fact, the true significance of the Advance Directive Statute's application
to Terri Schiavo has been almost entirely ignored. The fight over Terri's
treatment spawned scores of appellate and trial court rulings and two
probably unconstitutional statutes, one passed by the Florida legisla-
ture 149 and one passed by the United States Congress. 150 Yet it failed to
spark more than a superficial discussion of what should have mattered
most-Terri' s intent.
C. The Second District Court of Appeal's Opinions in Schiavo
Michael's legal fight with the Schindlers cycled through multiple
appeals at different levels, including a series of three published decisions
by Florida's Second District Court of Appeal. Yet, in all of that legal
paper, only a few words were devoted to what Terri would have wanted,
had she been capable of expressing herself. The rest focused on a medi-
cal category whose meaning changed from party to party, lawyer to law-
yer, court to court, and even from day to day. The three Second District
decisions, in particular, illustrate the degree to which the "persistent veg-
etative state" category has flummoxed the courts and obscured Brown-
ing's focus on patient intent and autonomy.
The Second District clearly attempted to take a reasoned, compas-
sionate approach to a difficult dispute, while honoring both Browning
145. Schiavo H, 800 So. 2d at 643.
146. Id. at 645.
147. See id. at 642-43.
148. Recent Developments, supra note 119, at 360.
149. See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004) (declaring that Terri's Law
"violates the fundamental constitutional tenet of separation of powers and is therefore
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to Theresa Schiavo.").
150. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382-84 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (declining to expressly declare U.S. Public Law 109-3, An Act for the Relief of the Parents
of Theresa Schiavo, unconstitutional, but nevertheless refusing to apply the law).
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and the Advance Directive Statute. This proved nearly impossible. In its
first opinion, the Second District devoted two meager sentences to
Michael's evidence of Terri's final wishes, and instead focused largely
on the severity of Terri's injuries, and the impossibility of her recov-
ery. '5 In its second opinion, the Court opined that a re-hearing of the
trial court's order to remove Terri's life support would only be appropri-
ate if Terri suddenly developed a chance of being completely cured.' 52
This hypothetical discussion of rehearing on the basis of a miracle cure
created a mess on remand, causing the Second District to apologize in its
third opinion for the "confusion" created by the second opinion. 1
53
Throughout the three decisions, the question of Terri's condition
predominated over all other inquiries. In its first decision, the Second
District noted that "[miedicine cannot cure this condition. Unless an act
of God, a true miracle, were to recreate her brain, Theresa will always
remain in an unconscious, reflexive state, totally dependent upon others
to feed her and care for her most private needs."1 54 Yet, by the time of
the third decision, the Schindlers' medical experts had convinced the
skeptical Second District Court of Appeals to order an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine whether Terri would have wanted to undergo a new
therapy that had a slim chance of restoring some degree of her cognitive
functions. 
55
In other words, the courts simply did not take Terri's wishes-or
lack thereof-into account. Instead, the courts apparently proceeded
under the assumption that a persistent vegetative state was simply such
an awful state of existence that no reasonable person would want to live
while experiencing it. As long as Michael could prove that Terri was
indeed in a persistent vegetative state, the courts would be willing to
151. See Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d 176, 177-78, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("Her statements to
her friends and family about the dying process were few and they were oral. Nevertheless, those
statements, along with other evidence about Theresa, gave the trial court a sufficient basis to make
this decision for her.").
152. Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of Schiavo), 792 So. 2d 551, 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) [hereinafter Schiavo 1m] ("Certainly, if medical research suddenly discovered a
complete cure for what had previously been thought to be a terminal condition as defined in
section 765.101(17), Florida Statutes (2000), we would treat that new circumstance as a matter
warranting relief from such a judgment.").
153. Schiavo II, 800 So. 2d 640, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("We conclude that our
examples misled the trial court into believing that only those types of allegations would suffice,
and we apologize for the confusion we created.").
154. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 177.
155. Schiavo 11, 800 So. 2d at 644. ("Purely from a lay perspective, this court must express
skepticism concerning Dr. Webber's affidavit. Nevertheless, when a doctor claims under oath that
he may be able to restore Mrs. Schiavo's ability to speak and otherwise restore her cognitive
function, and when numerous doctors dispute the diagnosis of persistent vegetative state based on
the records available to them, it is difficult for judges untrained in any medical specialty to
summarily reject their opinions without additional evidence.").
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overlook the utter paucity of evidence of Terri's intent. This warps
Browning beyond all recognition. Indeed, it represents the exact out-
come that conservatives feared when Browning was released, and
attempted to correct with the 1999 amendments to the Advance Direc-
tive Statute.
The Second District's focus on whether Terri was in a terminal
condition or a persistent vegetative state reveals two fundamental, con-
stitutional flaws in the Advance Directive Statute. First, the statute
places too much emphasis on vaguely defined clinical criteria as condi-
tions precedent to the removal of life support. This emphasis on medical
determinations apparently encouraged the Court to view "persistent veg-
etative state" or "terminal condition" as a pre-condition to the removal
of life support, on par with proof of Terri's wishes. This inquiry had no
relation to an actual determination of Terri's wishes.
Second, the Schiavo decisions also reveal the difficulty courts and
legislatures have in interpreting specialized medical designations. For
example, in its second Schiavo decision, the Second District character-
ized Terri as having a "terminal condition" under the Advance Directive
Statute.1 56 This is an accurate characterization that reveals the statute's
patent absurdity-Terri had a "terminal condition" because she had a
condition that, "without treatment, can be expected to cause death."' 57
Yet, as the Court noted in its previous decision, Terri had "sufficient
money and strength of body to live indefinitely" with the aid of a feed-
ing tube.1 58 In other words, Terri was found to have a "terminal condi-
tion" because she would die without food and water.
By inserting "persistent vegetative state" into the statute, and
retaining "terminal condition," the legislature stymied its own policy
goals and created lasting confusion for doctors, patients, and judges. The
legislature in 1999 was concerned with protecting the vulnerable. Yet
the statute produced by that legislature removed protection from some of
the most vulnerable patients in hospitals-those in persistent vegetative
states. As the Schiavo case demonstrates, courts will rely on the termi-
nal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative state language to allow the removal
of life support, based on clear and convincing evidence that a patient fits
into a particular medical state, and not that such a decision would have
been made by the patient herself.
At the same time, the Advance Directive Statute, as amended,
obscures the right of patients to determine what medical care they do or
156. Schiavo I11, 792 So. 2d at 560 ("Her condition is legally a 'terminal condition.' ") (citing
Fla. Stat. § 765.101(17) (2000)).
157. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(17) (2012).
158. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 180.
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do not receive at the end of their lives. In Terri's case, the terminal] end-
stage/ persistent vegetative state restrictions served to draw the courts'
attention away from the inquiry into patient intent mandated by Brown-
ing. But they could just as easily serve to limit the ability of a patient
with an explicit living will to determine his fate.
V. CONCLUSION
No empirical evidence exists on how doctors, hospital ethics
panels, and healthcare attorneys are interpreting and applying the
Advance Directive Statute on a day-to-day basis. But anecdotal evidence
indicates that the Statute's terminal and end-stage condition restrictions
are being used to force some patients to remain on life support, even
when the patients have no hope of recovery and have left clear living
wills. 59 As one person familiar with hospital procedures regarding end-
of-life care put it, doctors in Florida "have become their own risk man-
agers. '"6 ° Now, in some cases, even conscious patients are not allowed
to exercise their right to refuse medical treatment. 161 Moreover, national
studies have found that, even in states without bright-line restrictions
like those found in Florida's statute, doctors fail to adequately educate
patients and their families on end-of-life care.' 62 They tend to err on the
side of both aggressive and invasive over-treatment.
Perhaps, then, this is a simple example of hard cases making bad
law. The truth is, the vast majority of Americans are just not educated on
end-of-life care. And Americans' lack of knowledge regarding the stupe-
fying choices posed by modem life support creates enormous problems
for courts, legislators, and hospitals. We hope to protect the vulnerable,
while respecting the time-honored sanctity of individuals to do with
their own bodies what they please. Yet how can individuals determine
what to do with their bodies when they do not even know what the
options are?
While I was writing this paper, my mother prepared her living will,
designating my sisters and me as her surrogates. My mother was ada-
mant that she wanted to allow nature to take its course in the event of a
debilitating illness. Yet, when I began to discuss with her some of the
159. Cossetti, supra note 72, at 16 ("At the outset, doing away with the terminally ill
requirement was endorsed by various health care providers, a series of attorneys, and the Florida
Board of Medicine. The vast majority of the Panel for the Study of End-of-Life Care supported the
removal of the terminally ill requirement, under the impression that physicians might refrain from
classifying a patient as terminally ill since the phrase may be interpreted differently depending on
who is examining the patient.").
160. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Goodman, supra note 73.
161. Goodman, Commentary, supra note 19.
162. See Channick, supra note 32.
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more difficult life support scenarios that I learned of in my research, she
hesitated. She was prepared to order that life support be removed if she
was kept alive only by a respirator, and would die within minutes of its
removal. But she was less-than-enthusiastic when I broached the subject
of a coma, or persistent vegetative state, or partial brain atrophy, in
which she would only die, like Terri Schiavo, after days or weeks of
starvation or dehydration. It was an uncomfortable conversation, and I
can see why doctors and attorneys are hesitant to have it with the people
who count on them for advice.
The truth is that there is no easy answer to the quandary posed by
modem end-of-life care. Until the previous century, death for human
beings had always been an intimate, family- and community-oriented
affair. Now, the involvement of hospitals and states gives death an
industrial, bureaucratic component that presents enormous benefits, but
also significant risks.
Florida's attempt to balance these risks and benefits is a failure.
The law should encourage positive approaches to hard problems. In this
case, the Advance Directive Statute should encourage frank discussions
between patients, doctors, and lawyers regarding end-of-life care. It
should promote the capacity of Floridians, as educated citizens of a state
with an explicit constitutional privacy right, to determine how and when
they receive medical care. And it should protect the vulnerable from the
abuse inherent in a medical system characterized in no small degree by
cost considerations.
Yet this is not what the Advance Directive Statute does. Instead of
promoting the personal autonomy guaranteed by the state's constitution
and highest court, the statute injects a bright-line restriction on with-
drawing treatment. This restriction was clearly not given the thought or
debate that it deserved. And instead of protecting the vulnerable, the
statute focuses the attention of decision makers on vague, poorly defined
clinical criteria.
This is not to say that there should be no restrictions on individuals'
right to refuse treatment. Life support should never be withdrawn from
incapacitated patients with a chance of meaningful recovery, or even
from patients who will not fully recover, but who nevertheless would
wish to continue receiving life-sustaining treatments. Further, hospitals
and governments should not be in the business of assisting their patients
to commit suicide, or of determining that some lives are not worth pre-
serving. But the terminal/ end-stage/ persistent vegetative state catego-
ries only partially serve these worthy ends.
The Florida Legislature may have had good reason to fear that
Browning went too far in the direction of self-determination. But the
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constitutionally proper and practically effective response would have
been to work within Browning's framework rather than to abandon it.
Browning and its progeny allow for proof- and policy-based restrictions
on the right to refuse medical treatment. Both types of restrictions, if
carefully applied, can sufficiently protect vulnerable patients from
abuse, while allowing hospitals to respect the wishes of patients who
truly have no hope of recovery.
Further, an increased emphasis on evidentiary restrictions would
logically encourage a broader discussion of the decisions patients may
have regarding their end-of-life care. This discussion could, in turn, help
to solve the conundrum faced by courts and hospitals examining a peti-
tion to remove life support from an incompetent patient. If the patient's
wishes were truly reliable, and the patient's condition truly hopeless and
irreversible, then the hardest case would become just a little easier.
